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Abstract 
This paper aims to present a study on knowledge management for the disassembly of end-of-life aircraft. We propose a 
model using Bayesian networks to assess risk and present three approaches to integrate the belief functions standing for the  
representation of fuzzy and uncertain knowledge.
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1 Introduction 
1.1 General overview
The disassembly of end-of-life aircraft shows nowadays a rapid growth for several reasons. Firstly, the aircraft  
fleet ageing raises substantially the number of aircraft arriving at their end-of-life period. In addition, the recent  
changes in regulations significantly increase the manufacturer liability regarding the management of the end of 
life of their aircraft. Finally current environmental concerns encourage aircraft manufacturers to integrate the 
environmental dimension in their industrial strategies.
This paper aims to present a study on knowledge management for the disassembly of end-of-life aircraft. Our 
work is part of a project called “DIAGNOSTAT”. This project, supported by the Aerospace Valley cluster, is 
funded  by  the  “Fond  Unique  Interministériel”  (FUI).  In  this  context  we  wish  to  develop  decision-support  
mechanisms using the experience feedback to perform risk assessments on critical areas of an aircraft.
1.2 Problematic
The DIAGNOSTAT project  focuses  on  two specific  aspects  of  aircraft  deconstruction  which  are,  first,  the 
recovery  and  the  certification  of  parts  for  reuse  as  spares,  and,  secondly,  the  knowledge  capitalization  on  
airplane status (in particular its critical areas) to improve aircraft design and maintenance.
In  this  context,  we  focus  specifically  on  the  capitalization  of  the  knowledge  generated  during  aircraft  
deconstruction. We aim the establishment of an information system to facilitate knowledge management used in 
the aircraft deconstruction and particularly during the inspection phase of the plane. We first planned to build an 
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inspection procedure to collect and formalize knowledge in a systematic way. These data should be stored in the  
information  system.  Finally,  a  module  will  be  developed  to  analyse,  capitalize  and  take  advantage  of  the 
knowledge generated during the inspection or the data analysis. This experience feedback tool should provide  
the opportunity to match the living and using conditions of the aircraft with the different defects on an airplane  
critical areas through statistical and expert analysis.
This framework allows to developing an application to assess the risk on critical parts and areas of an airplane.  
This  tool  will  use  a  database  and  a  statistical  analysis  module  that  will  be  deployed  in  the  project  
DIAGNOSTAT. It will use the information system to exploit the knowledge resulting from the disassembly of 
end-of-life aircraft.
This database will contain:  the references of each aircraft  (type,  option, ...),  the living and using conditions 
(long-haul or national flights, weather conditions, maintenance, ...) and the various defects encountered during 
decommissioning and / or maintenance. The statistical analysis module will put into perspective the information 
to generate statistics exploitable by the user. We propose to deepen the capabilities of this tool by associating a 
risk assessment module which, in addition to the raw statistics from the statistical analysis module, integrates  
knowledge of experts to provide a risk assessment on  a critical areas of the aircraft (Figure 1).
Fig. 1. General mechanism proposed. 
1.3 Approach used
To address this issue, a review encompassing the science fields relevant to our work (knowledge management,  
feedback, risk assessment) has been achieved and the deconstruction process of an airplane has been modelled to  
get  a  better  understanding  of  issues  and  constraints  associated  with  this  activity  [15].  Subsequently,  a  risk 
assessment model was built, based on our review of the literature, to represent the risk. Bayesian networks were 
used for their ability to simply model a risk situation and we expanded it to reach a generic risk assessment 
model.  However,  the uncertainty modelling is complex because of the limitations imposed by the Bayesian  
networks  and  more  particularly  by  the  probabilistic  mechanisms  they  are  associated  with.  Within  this  
framework, belief functions can be of a great help. We decided consequently to consider their integration into  
Bayesian networks model.
This communication is divided into three parts. We develop, firstly, the concepts useful for understanding the  
decision support mechanisms presented in this paper. We begin with concepts related to risk assessment and 
explain the notions associated with Bayesian networks. Then we propose a model that uses Bayesian networks to 
assess risk and detail its various applications and limitations. Finally, we introduce belief functions, which can 
overcome  the  limitations  imposed  by  Bayesian  networks,  and  propose  three  approaches  to  integrate  belief 
functions in the risk assessment model together with the opportunities offered by these mechanisms.
2 Key concepts
2.1 Risk assessment
The different concepts useful for understanding the mechanisms of risk assessment are presented in this section.  
We start  by defining the concept of risk,  before analysing in details the risk assessment process.  Then,  we 
analyse the risk assessment phase, which is part of risk management process [2] that we will not further develop 
here. Finally, we present the architecture of the selected risk representation.
2.1.1 Definitions of the concept of risk
The  various  definitions  found  in  the  literature  generally  present  the  risk  as  a  combination  of  hazard  and 
vulnerability. It is seen as the product between the occurrence probability of a negative event (the hazard) and the 
estimated severity of the event (vulnerability) [4]. However, this definition does not take into account the notions 
of causes and consequences presented by [9] as risk attributes. Therefore, we adopt the definition proposed by [6] 
which defines  the  risk  that  an event  occurs  as  the  association  of  the  “cause  events”  characterized  by their  
occurrence (P), and the “consequence events” (effects) characterized by their severity or impact (I). The risk can 
be so determined by R = f (occurrence, impact) = f (P, I) (Figure 2).
Fig. 2. Characterization of a risk by [6]. 
2.1.2 Risk assessment
According to risk management process, risk assessment consists in comparing the observed state of the system 
with other known situations. There are two main categories of tools to achieve this assessment: the ranking and 
the referential.
The ranking is a method that aims to make a relative positioning of the studied situation with respect to a set of 
standard situations. However a lack of precision can be noted for this representation since it can include some 
atypical risks considered as the most dangerous (e.g. a risk with a significant occurrence probability and a strong 
impact). To fill these gaps, some risk referentials allows the positioning of the risk according to a combination of 
its occurrence probability and its severity (Figure 3).
Fig. 3. Representations 3D, 2D and simplified 2D of risk referential.
The risk referential offers a more comprehensive representation of risk, which can easily be adapted to each 
situation by altering the calculation function of risk. The risk is traditionally defined by the relation R = P x I, 
but the literature offers many other formulations. For example, to highlight the risks with a knock-on impact, the 
formula R = P x Ik [14] may be used.
2.1.3 Architecture used
The vision of the risk, presented in the part “2.1.1” of this communication (Figure 2), can easily be extended to 
more complex risks by using the event sequence described above. Each situation is composed of “cause events”, 
“consequence events” and a “target event”.  It is possible to scan a chain of situations (a “cause event” of a 
situation  is  a  “consequence  event”  of  another,  and  vice  versa)  to  study  the  root  causes  or  the  ultimate 
consequences. This representation of risk in sequence (Figure 4) allows formalizing the knowledge from the 
deconstruction and the maintenance of an aircraft. The expertise will be used in parallel with the experience  
feedback  to  find  the  classic  event  sequence  and  thus  to  determine  the  root  causes  that  lead  to  visible 
consequences in fine. This diagnostic step is dedicated to the search of the origin of the problem but also to the  
definition of the succession of events that could potentially lead to a feared event.
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Fig. 4. Representations 3D, 2D and simplified 2D of risk referential.
2.2 Bayesian networks
2.2.1 Principles
Bayesian networks [10] are graphical models used to formalize knowledge. They are directed and acyclic graphs 
where knowledge is represented by variables. Each node in the graph represents a variable and the arcs represent 
probabilistic dependencies between these variables. According to [11], if  {Xi, i = 1, ..., n} is the set of network 
variables, then pa(Xi) is the set of parents (also known as predecessors or causes) of Xi. A Bayesian network is 
composed of:
• variables X1, …, Xn represented by nodes,
• arcs between variables which represent causal links and to form a directed acyclic graph,
• probability tables related to each variable  X according to its parents,  P(Xi | pa(Xi)). Thus all probabilities 
define the joint probability distribution for the network:
The conditional probability tables can also represent deterministic rules. Such as “ if X = a1 then Y = b1”. These 
rules can be used to model logic gates or constraint satisfaction problems.
The  information  propagation  in  the  network  uses  Bayesian  inference.  This  approach  allows  calculating  or  
revising the assumptions probabilities of the network based on probability tables and knowledge acquired over  
time. The Bayesian inference mechanisms [8] use rules for combining probabilities from the Bayes theorem [1], 
which will not be reminded here.
2.2.2 Influence diagrams
The influence diagrams [7] are used to represent decision issues by the way of graphs. This generalization of 
Bayesian networks provides opportunities to model and solve not only probabilistic problems but also decision 
support problems.
To achieve this goal, two additional types of nodes are available compared to Bayesian networks. There are  
three kinds of nodes in an influence diagram [5]:
• Chance nodes represent the different variables of the problem. These are the same nodes in Bayesian  
networks.
• Decision nodes are used to model the various alternatives available to the decision maker for  each 
problem decision.
• Utility nodes allow to evaluate these alternatives according to an optimisation criterion. This criterion is  
often represented as a cost.
In an influence diagram, the arc meaning differs according to the nodes that are put in relation:
• When an arc connects two chance nodes, it has the same meaning as in a Bayesian network, i.e. it 
represents the causal link between two variables.
• When an arc points to a chance node from a decision node, each alternative decision node influences  
the different values likely to be taken by the variable represented by the chance node.
• When an arc points to a decision node, the decision requires knowledge corresponding to the value of 
the origin node of the arc.
• When an arc points to a utility node, a value is sent to the utility table standing for the loss or benefit 
generated by the previous decisions.
P  X 1 ,... , X n=∏
i=1
n
P  X i∣pa X i
3 Proposed model
3.1 Presentation
To build the risk assessment model, we chose to use the representation of risks in sequence (Figure 4). However, 
some changes have been introduced in the model since, in the considered case, the feared event is not the defect,  
but relates to the consequences of this defect which are often more destructive than the defect itself.
The  model  (Figure  5)  uses  the  principles  of  influence  diagram  and  respects  the  construction  rules  of  this 
formalism to provide a risk assessment on a part or a sub-assembly. It is divided into two sub-models. The first  
one only uses Bayesian networks to represent the risk and calculate the occurrence probability of dangerous 
events.  The second  one  uses  the  probabilities  calculated  by  the  first  sub-model  and  the influence  diagram 
concepts of utility and decision to assess the risks.
Fig. 5. Risk assessment model.
The fist sub-model is structured in three layers. This phase of data processing only uses Bayesian networks and 
the inference mechanisms to propagate information in the three layers namely:
• the causes: events that lead to the defect. The causes may result from the life of the aircraft before its 
deconstruction but also from the consequences of another defect. Thus the defect consequences may 
influence the occurrence of another failure. For readability, these links are not shown in Figure 5.
• the defects: physical phenomena observed on a part or a sub-assembly of the plane. Hierarchical defects 
have been considered in order to meet the studied system structure. Therefore, a system composed of 
two parts will be represented by three potential defects (one per part and one for the complete system). 
The presence of the defect on a piece necessarily implies that the defect is also present on the entire  
system. Conversely, the presence of the defect on the system can not be propagated into because of the 
impossibility to determine which one is actually affected.
• the consequences: dangerous events induced by the defect(s). As we stated previously, a consequence  
of a defect can also be the cause of another one.
The occurrence probabilities are associated with the defects, their causes and their consequences. The inference 
mechanisms allow the change of these probabilities based on observations and therefore the certitudes acquired 
during inspection and recertification tests on parts or sub-assemblies.
The following example (Figure 6) illustrates the model on a simple application case.
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Fig. 6. Example of model application on a simplified case of corrosion.
The causes are characterized by their occurrence probabilities (for example, there are 80% of chance that the 
cause  S is true).  The defects and the consequences are  defined by conditional  probability tables containing  
information on the impact of different causes on the defect occurrence (e.g. if S and P are true, then there is a 
95% of chance that  D is true or if  D is true then there is a 90% of chance that  X is true). With respect to the 
defects in particular, they are also subject to rules that affect the occurrence of an event to the parent level (for  
example, if D1 is true then D is true).
The second part  of  the model  allows the risk assessment by introducing  the specific  elements of  influence  
diagrams. Utility nodes are used to quantify the impact of consequences. Each consequence is coupled with a 
specific  utility  node  through  a  decision  node  which  allows  to  assess  the  risk  by  using  a  function  like 
“Risk = Probability x Impact”.
3.2 Possible use cases
The primary use of this model is the risk assessment during aircraft deconstruction. The user will be able to  
quickly assess whether  the part  or  sub-assembly could be reusable  or  whether  it  should be sent directly  to  
materials recycling. The objective is then to provide a quick risk assessment based on information resulting from 
the  aircraft  life   (logbook,  maintenance  record,  ...)  and  superficial  observations  made  during  the  plane 
inspection. It may avoid a set of expensive tests for deconstruction and recertifying a part in the case where the 
model indicates that the risk of reintroducing a used part is too high. Moreover, following the deconstruction  
progression and the data-gathering, the assessment will be refined which will enable the decision-maker's to 
validate its choice.
This kind of representation also provides a number of additional operating possibilities. First, it will be possible,  
from the visible consequences of an event, to determine the probable presence of hidden consequences which 
result from the dynamics that led to the defect. For example, if a user has to certify a part which is slightly  
corroded at the surface, he may be informed of a probable deterioration of the mechanical properties of the part  
because the experience acquired in the past has shown the association between these two phenomena.
In addition, this type of model allows the introduction of statistical and probabilistic knowledge coming from a 
database in order to refine and consolidate the expert knowledge. In this way, users have additional tools to 
assist them in decision-making. The application can then issue statistical information about a particular event, 
indicating, for example, that a visible consequence is associated in 80% of cases with another hidden or visible  
consequence. The reaction may be then adapted, as appropriate, to achieve better phenomena management.
If the data are used in maintenance, the tool can be used to adapt the maintenance actions with respect to the  
aircraft life, focusing on some sensitive areas for specific mission profiles or engaging additional checks when  
phenomena usually associated with critical defects are detected.
Similarly,  in  the  context  of  use  for  the  certification  of  second-hand  parts,  the  user  may request  additional 
verifications resulting from events suggesting larger problems. He can also decide to put off a part on the basis  
of superficial observations because the risk is too important.
Finally, the use of the model may be helpful during aircraft design. In this case, the model will support the risk  
assessment for critical part failure during its design for a particular mission profile and thus adapt the technical  
solutions (choice of materials or geometry, for example). The goal is to make the part more resistant to stresses 
that it  will  encounter  in real  use.  This type of  experience feedback seems less relevant  because the current  
technologies used to design an aircraft are often different from those used 30 years ago, as it is the case for most  
aircraft  deconstructed  today.  However,  there  are notable exceptions in cases of  aircraft  deconstructed much 
earlier in their life cycle, for example, those involved in accidents for which the cost of repairs exceeds the value  
of the aircraft.
3.3 Limits of use
One of  the  first  problems  encountered  is  that  it  is  impossible  to  meet,  in  a  single  model  using  influence 
diagrams, knowledge of several experts and data obtained from a statistical database. However, this feature is 
one major objective of our research which will lead to merge explicit and tacit information inside a same model.
In addition, Bayesian networks operate from input information modelled as probability distributions. However,  
we intend to model information  reflecting  expertness.  If  the probability theory can  be used to quantify  the 
randomness  of  the  information  (variability),  it  does  not  allow  the  integration  of  epistemic  information 
(incompleteness,  imprecision).  Indeed,  the principle  of  symmetry  or  indifference  (equiprobability)  does not 
permit to make a difference between the representation of a random situation and a partially described context  
[3].
4 Integration of belief functions
Consequently, belief functions have been selected, and in particular the Transferable Belief Model (TBM), to  
represent  the  epistemic  character  of  expert  information.  This  rich  and  flexible  framework  enable  the 
generalization of probability and possibility theories.
Below, we briefly  introduce the TBM with an emphasis on different ways of representing information.  The 
interested reader can refer in particular to [13] for a further description of the TBM.
4.1 The Transferable Belief Model
The TBM interprets a belief function as representing the views of a rational agent based on the belief or state of 
knowledge of the individual, even if it is inaccurate or incomplete.
4.1.1 Credal and pignistic levels
The transferable  belief  model  assumes  that  reasoning  under  uncertainty  (credal  level)  and  decision  making 
(pignistic level) are two different cognitive tasks:
• the  credal  level  corresponds  to  the  representation  and  manipulation  of  belief  states  without 
simplification (e.g. without the use of equiprobable distribution).
• the  pignistic  level  corresponds  to  the  decision-making.  It  consists  in  transforming  the  subjective 
measures of non-probabilistic belief  in a probability measure called pignistic (BetP).
The pignistic transformation is irreversible but only intervenes during decision-making and does not alter the 
credal level.
4.1.2 Basic belief assignment
The modelling of belief functions is based on the allocation of a non-additive subjective measure of the chance 
of an event to occur.  Contrary to the Dempster-Schafer (DST) which is the TBM origin,  this representation 
exists without reference to a probability or a family of underlying probabilities.
The basic belief  assignment  (bba) of  a mass  m results in a state of  partial  knowledge about  the value of  a 
variable belonging to Ω and the definition domain called frame of discernment. If wi are the atomic elements and 
Ai are subsets of Ω, we have: 
Thus, the belief assignment is a distribution of a unit mass on the parts of Ω (power set), i.e. on the subsets of the 
frame of discernment (for a set of size n, it can represent 2n elements). The notation is P(Ω) or 2Ω. The ability to 
assign masses to the made assumptions, and therefore to work on 2Ω rather than Ω, is one of the advantages of 
this theory. This used to represent partial knowledge.
Ω={w1 , w2 ,w3 , ... , wn}and∀ i , Ai⊆Ω
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mΩ(A) corresponds to the “belief part” allocated by source  S to the assumption  w ∈ A and no more restrictive 
assumption. mΩ is given by the following formula:
4.1.3 Credibility and plausibility measures
From a mass distribution which is a strict belief that one can not specify, it is possible to get one-to-one manner  
of different but semantically equivalent representations. The most important are the dual functions of credibility 
(denoted Cr) and plausibility (denoted Pl).
The  credibility  Cr reflects  the  minimum  belief  in  an  information  (minimal  likelihood).  It  is  given  by  the 
following formula:
The plausibility  Pl reflects the maximum belief in an information (maximum likelihood). These are all beliefs 
that do not contradict A. It is given by the following formula:
4.2 Integration of belief functions
4.2.1 Fusion of belief functions
A given belief state at a given moment can change according to a new information or to be combined, merged  
with compatible knowledge states (same problem and same frame of discernment). The fusion operation is to 
combine several information covering the same question in a new belief structure defined on the same universe. 
This operation is performed using combination operators which can exploit the redundancy and the overlap of  
multiple information sources.
We want to use these characteristics of TBM to merge the opinion of several experts (Figure 7). The database is  
in this case considered as an expert and expresses an opinion from the extracted statistics. This opinion is then 
transformed into belief function with respect to the number of situations related to the problem studied in order  
to estimate a confidence degree in the statistical value extracted. The expert opinions are directly expressed as  
belief functions. All these belief functions are then merged and weighted according to the system confidence in 
each expert (including the database).
Fig. 7. Fusion of belief functions.
4.2.2 Integration of belief functions into the model
• Pre-processing of belief functions:
The first solution envisaged is to deal separately with the belief functions and the Bayesian network model. This  
method is synthesized in Figure 8.
Fig. 8. Pre-processing of belief functions.
2Ω={A⊆Ω}={∅ , {w1}, ... , {wn} ,{w1∪w2}, ... , {Ω }}
mΩ={ 2
Ω[0,1]
∑
A∈2Ω
mΩ A=1}
∀ A⊆Ω ,Cr  A= ∑
B⊆A , B≠∅
m B
∀ A⊆Ω , Pl A= ∑
B∩A≠∅
mB
After  merging the different  belief  functions representing  expert  and database opinions (4.2.1),  the resulting 
belief function is transformed into a pignistic probability (4.1.1). This probability is then directly inserted into 
the Bayesian network.
The main advantage lies in the fact that this method does not require any adaptation of the model since the 
Bayesian networks naturally use probabilities. Therefore, the pignistic probability integration is not a problem. 
However, the pignistic transformation causes a loss of information especially with respect to uncertainty which is 
not propagated and is therefore invisible in the model. The extracted result ignores this uncertainty.
• Discretization of belief functions:
To fill  this gap,  we can choose to discretise the belief  function resulting from the fusion. This approach is 
presented in Figure 9.
Fig. 9. Discretization of belief functions.
For  this,  several  noteworthy  values  are  chosen  for  each  resulting  belief  function.  It  is  possible  to  retain 
credibility, plausibility and the average of these two values for each belief function and use it as a probability in  
Bayesian networks. So there is a Bayesian network by value and by belief function.
The main difficulty which is encountered at this stage, is the combinatorial explosion in the number of Bayesian 
networks required to deal with a problem with multiple variables and therefore several belief functions. Indeed,  
if k is the number of values selected for each belief function and v the number of variables, then the number of 
networks N is given as follows: N = kv. A mechanism to reduce the combinatorial problem to limit the number of 
Bayesian networks  to  be performed should  therefore  be provided.  In  addition,  this  method requires  a  final  
synthesis to bring together the results of all the Bayesian networks and facilitate the result readability to the user.
The advantage of this approach lies in obtaining a probability range for representing uncertainty expressed by 
experts at the decision-making instant. However, the discretization also leads to a loss of information compared 
to the resulting belief function. This information loss is less than in the pignistic transformation case but can be  
nevertheless.
• Bayesian networks based on belief functions:
The latter approach that we present (Figure 10), solves the problems introduced by the two previous methods. It 
involves inserting the belief functions directly into a Bayesian network modified to handle such data.
Fig. 10. Bayesian networks based on belief functions.
The main problem with this approach lies in adapting Bayesian networks to the treatment of belief functions. 
The formalism of the model variables must be reviewed so that they are no longer represented by probabilities, 
but by belief functions.  The Bayesian inference mechanisms must also be adapted to allow the information  
propagation in the network from these belief functions and the consideration of uncertainty.
The most significant advantage is the deferral of the conversion to a decision level (pignistic level) until the last 
moment.  This method is a priori,  the most interesting because the inherent  modelling error  in the pignistic  
transformation, and therefore the decision-making level, is delayed to the maximum.
We wish to couple the Bayesian networks with TBM and to this purpose, two features of TBM are important and 
should  be  the  starting  point  in  order  to  redefine  the  inference  mechanisms  of  Bayesian  networks.  First, 
probabilities  and  belief  functions  are  expressed  from  a  unit  mass  distribution  on  a  set  of  possible  values.  
However,  the  TBM  allows  more  choices.  Finally,  in  an  analogous  way  to  the  conditional  probabilities, 
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conditional beliefs have been defined  [16] and the Generalized Bayes Theorem (GBT) is the extension of the 
Bayes Theorem to belief functions [13].
In addition, there are some recent works dealing with the problematic of combined use of Bayesian networks  
and  TBM.  We have  identified  two  promising  approaches.  The  first  is  the  hybridization  by  redefining  the 
conditional probability tables from the basic belief assignment. This approach involves constructing tables of 
belief mass distribution over all subsets of the domain. In [12], the table construction is simplified because it is 
associated with binary states and known variation laws (AND, OR and XOR gates).  The second consists in 
redefining Bayesian inference mechanisms in the light of the Generalized Bayes theorem (GBT)  [13]. In this 
context,  recent  studies  define  oriented  credal  networks,  similar  to  Bayesian  networks,  but  based  on  belief 
functions [17].
5 Conclusion
This paper proposes a model for risk assessment based on experts advice and statistical data for decision support  
during the deconstruction of end-of-life aircraft.
This proposition is based on the joint use of Bayesian networks and representation by the Transferable Belief 
Model. We describe three methods of hybridization of these two approaches. The perspectives on this work are 
various:
• consolidate processing algorithms for hybrid models,
• refine the mechanisms to acquire expertise from the database and expert advice,
• test out the proposal by using a dedicated demonstrator.
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